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WILLS-GIF[ BY IMPLICATION-Effectuating the Intent of the
Testator: New Mexico Boys Ranch, Inc. v. Hanvey
I. INTRODUCTION
In New Mexico Boys Ranch, Inc. v. Hanvey,' the New Mexico Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the testatrix intended the devise in
her will to the New Mexico Boys Ranch to be solely contingent upon
the simultaneous deaths of herself and her mother, or whether she also
intended her estate to pass to the New Mexico Boys Ranch if her mother
predeceased her.2 After analyzing all of the provisions of the will, in-
cluding the simultaneous death clause, the supreme court held the testatrix
intended the New Mexico Boys Ranch to receive her entire estate if the
testatrix' mother was deceased at the time the will became effective.3 This
result can be reconciled with the policy underlying the Statute of Wills,4
which is to give effect to the intent of the testator.5
The supreme court appropriately decided New Mexico Boys Ranch
because it was clear from the language of the will that the testatrix did
not want her estate to pass by intestacy6 to her heirs, which would have
been the result if the devise to the New Mexico Boys Ranch had failed.
Furthermore, extrinsic evidence of a trust created by the testatrix for the
benefit of the New Mexico Boys Ranch indicated the testatrix wanted
her estate to pass to the New Mexico Boys Ranch in the event her mother
1. 97 N.M. 771, 643 P.2d 857 (1982).
2. The supreme court stated more generally that the issue was "whether the intent of the testatrix
can be ascertained from the language of her will. If it can be so ascertained, then it controls the
distribution of decedent's estate." Id. at 772, 643 P.2d at 858.
3. Id. at 773, 643 P.2d at 859.
4. The Statute of Wills in New Mexico requires a will to be in writing, signed by the testator,
and attested in the presence of the testator by two or more credible witnesses. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-
2-502 (1978). These formalities serve three purposes: (I) to warn the testator of the seriousness and
finality of the instrument (cautionary function); (2) to protect the testator from coercement and the
testator's disposition of property from fraud (evidentiary function); and (3) to facilitate the processing
of wills through the courts (channeling function). W. Bowe and D. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills
§ 19.4 (3d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Page on Wills]. See Langbein and Waggoner, Reformation
of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev.
521, 529 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Langbein and Waggoner, Reformation of Wills].
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-4-603 (1978) provides that the intention of a testator as expressed in his
will controls the legal effect of his dispositions. See also Langbein and Waggoner, Reformation of
Wills, supra note 4, at 529.
6. An intestate estate results when a decedent has not effectively disposed of his or her property
by will. In New Mexico, such property passes to the decedent's heirs as prescribed in N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 45-2-102 to -103 (1978).
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predeceased her. The conclusion reached by the supreme court, however,
was not well-supported.
The intent of the testator is the primary consideration when interpreting
a will. 7 The court in New Mexico Boys Ranch said the intent of the
testatrix, as expressed in her will, was for the New Mexico Boys Ranch
to take her estate if her mother was not living at the time of the testatrix'
death. Yet, the devise to the New Mexico Boys Ranch appeared to be
conditioned upon the simultaneous death of the testatrix and her mother.
The court did not explain why the condition of simultaneous death was
ignored and how it determined the testatrix' intent to give her estate to
the New Mexico Boys Ranch in the event her mother predeceased her.
The occurrence of the testatrix' mother predeceasing her was not ex-
pressly provided for in the will. The "no-reformation" rule states that a
court cannot add language to a will to supply an omission or to correct
a mistake because such language has not been written down, signed, and
attested as required by the Statute of Wills.8 The court in New Mexico
Boys Ranch did not explain how it could read the omitted provision into
the will without violating the "no-reformation" rule. Hence, the court's
opinion represents a troublesome precedent that has constructive and
destructive potential.
The first part of this Note discusses an analytical framework which the
New Mexico Supreme Court could have used to reconcile its result with
the policies that underlie the Statute of Wills. This analysis assumes the
supreme court determined the testatrix did not intend to condition her
devise to the New Mexico Boys Ranch upon simultaneous death of her
mother and herself. The court perceived that the terms of the will disclosed
the intent of the testatrix to leave all her property to the New Mexico
Boys Ranch in the event her mother predeceased her. To enforce this
intent, the court apparently implied a gift to the New Mexico Boys Ranch
from all the language of the will. Gift by implication is the most reasonable
theory supporting the court's result in this case.
The second part of this Note addresses two remedies which the supreme
court could have employed instead of implying a gift. Under the first
remedy, the supreme court could have deleted some of the language in
the simultaneous death clause. With this deletion, the New Mexico Boys
Ranch would have been entitled to the testatrix' estate as an unconditional
residuary beneficiary. The second remedy would have allowed the su-
preme court to add language obviously omitted by the testatrix in her
7. 97 N.M. at 773, 643 P.2d at 859.
8. Langbein and Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 4, at 566. The terms of a will must
be in writing. A court cannot probate anything that is not in the instrument. An omitted devise cannot
be supplied by a court, but a court has power to deny probate of words or to reject the entire will.
T. Atkinson, Law of Wills § 58 (2d ed. 1953).
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will by utilizing the doctrine of probable intent. The court could have
added to the simultaneous death clause the phrase "or if my mother
predeceases me," thereby enforcing the testatrix' probable intent to give
her estate to the New Mexico Boys Ranch. Yet, this probable intent
doctrine is a novel departure from traditional theory in that it in effect
adds unattested words to the will.
The drawback of the first remedy is that words formally attested by
the testatrix would be deleted from the will. 9 The drawback of the second
remedy is that words not formally attested would be added to the will. ' 0
Both of these remedies are more difficult to reconcile with the policies
that underlie the Statute of Wills than is the theory of gift by implication.
Moreover, it is often unclear whether the correction of an omission or a
mistake represents a permissible "construction"'" of the language of the
will or an inappropriate addition to existing language.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The testatrix, Mary E. Martin, died in New Mexico on September 18,
1979, leaving a will dated August 17, 1966. Martin devised her entire
estate to her mother. 2 In the event of simultaneous death of Martin and
her mother, however, Martin devised her estate to the New Mexico Boys
Ranch.' 3 The will also stated that the only other person known to the
testatrix who might expect to share in her estate was her brother, whom
9. Even though a court has power to delete words from a will, those words have been written
down and attested to by the testator and should only be deleted as a last resort in order to effectuate
the overall intent of the testator. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. "In the law of wills, it is generally said that construction is the ascertaining of testator's
intention as expressed in his will when read in the light of the surrounding circumstances and in
view of the admissible evidence, including the application of his intention as thus manifested to the
facts and circumstances with which the will deals." Page on Wills, supra note 4, at § 30.2. "[T]he
will of the testator is to be construed as an entirety and all of the provisions are to be rendered
consistent with each other." Id. § 30.11. "[Tlhe general intent of the testator as deduced from the
consideration of the will as a whole . . .[however] is [often inconsistent] with a particular clause."
Id. "This usually arises when the testator has not carefully thought out the application of the provisions
of his will to all possible states of fact, and has not, therefore, foreseen the contingency which has
caused the inconsistency." Id. In such a case, the court will not make a new will for the testator,
but may disregard the intent of a particular clause and give effect to the clear, general intent of the
test?'r. Id.
12. PARAGRAPH SECOND of Martin's will provided: "I will, devise and bequeath all the rest,
remainder and residue of my estate . . . unto my beloved mother, Mary M. Martin, absolutely." 97
N.M. at 772, 643 P.2d at 858.
13. PARAGRAPH FOURTH of Martin's will provided: "In the event that my death should occur
simultaneously with my beloved mother . . . then it is to be presumed that my said mother, Mary
M. Martin, died first, and the paragraph herein denominated SECOND [absolute devise of all property
to Martin's mother] shall lapse and be inoperative, and I then, give ...the rest, remainder and
residue of my estate . . . to the New Mexico Boys Ranch .. " 97 N.M. at 772, 643 P.2d at 858
(emphasis omitted). New Mexico's Simultaneous Death Act furnishes a disposition of property where
a will has not provided for the event of simultaneous death. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-8-1 to -8 (1978).
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she desired to receive no part of her estate. ' 4 Martin also provided that
if any person should establish a right to inherit her estate, that person
was bequeathed one dollar. 5 Martin's mother died more than six years
prior to the testatrix' death. Shortly before her own death, Martin placed
the bulk of her property in trust for the benefit of the New Mexico Boys
Ranch. 16
In a probate proceeding, the trial court held that the testatrix left her
entire estate by will to the New Mexico Boys Ranch.17 Rosa Hanvey,
testatrix' first cousin, appealed the decision of the trial court. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Martin reversed the trial court
and held that the New Mexico Boys Ranch was to take under the will
only in the event Martin and her mother died at the same time.18 The
court of appeals stated that the testatrix' failure to include in her will an
unqualified bequest disposing of her estate in the event that her mother
predeceased her was an omission which could not be cured by the court. 9
The court of appeals determined the estate passed by intestacy to the
appellant, Rosa Hanvey, because the contingency of simultaneous death
did not occur and because there was no other distributee under the will .20
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
held it was the overall intent of the testatrix that the New Mexico Boys
Ranch receive her estate if her mother could not inherit it. 2' In construing
a will, the court noted that it primarily considers the intent of the testator. 
22
The supreme court explained it cannot determine the testator's intent by
looking at only one provision of the will, such as a simultaneous death
clause, while ignoring the other provisions. The court must consider the
will as a whole. 23 Furthermore, the court stated there is a strong pre-
sumption in favor of testacy.
24
14. PARAGRAPH THIRD of Martin's will provided: "I hereby declare and state that I have a
brother, Aubrey Lee Martin . . . who is the only other person known to me who might expect to
share in my estate, and that it is my express will and desire that he receive no part of my estate
whatever." 97 N.M. at 772, 643 P.2d at 858 (emphasis omitted).
15. PARAGRAPH SEVENTH of Martin's will provided: "I have noted in my lifetime that many
times some person or persons have attempted through Courts and otherwise to establish a right to
inherit from a deceased person. I do not wish for this to happen in my estate; therefore, should any
person or persons other than my beloved mother, Mary M. Martin, establish a right to inherit from
me . . . then . . . I hereby give . . . such person or persons the sum of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00)
each, which shall constitute the only share of any such person or persons in my estate." Id. (emphasis
omitted).
16. Id.
17. In re Estate of Martin, 97 N.M. 773, 775, 643 P.2d 859, 861 (Ct. App. 1981).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 778, 643 P.2d at 864.
20. Id. at 779, 643 P.2d at 865. The decision by the New Mexico Court of Appeals exemplifies
traditional principles of the law of wills. It is generally held that a contingent will takes effect only
upon the happening of a specific contingency. Page on Wills, supra note 4, at § 9.1.
21. New Mexico Boys Ranch v. Hanvey, 97 N.M. 771, 773, 643 P.2d 857, 859 (1982).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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By construing the will in its entirety, the supreme court determined
that Martin would have preferred the New Mexico Boys Ranch to inherit
her estate. The court noted that she disinherited her only known heir, her
brother, and bequeathed one dollar to all other possible heirs who might
establish a right to inherit from her."5 Furthermore, after her mother's
death and shortly before her own death, Martin placed the bulk of her
property in trust for the benefit of the New Mexico Boys Ranch. This
evidence must have persuaded the court that Martin's primary intent was
for her property to pass to the New Mexico Boys Ranch and not by
intestacy to her heirs in the event her mother predeceased her.
I1. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The following discussion includes an analysis of the gift by implication
theory and two nontraditional remedies which practitioners may wish to
present to the court in the future.
A. An Analytical Framework Supporting the Supreme Court's Decision
The New Mexico Supreme Court held it was the intent of the testatrix
that the New Mexico Boys Ranch receive her estate if her mother pre-
deceased her.26 First, the following analysis centers upon what the su-
preme court perceived to be the intent of the testatrix regarding the
disposition of her property. Second, the court must have considered the
devise to the New Mexico Boys Ranch not to be contingent upon the
simultaneous death of Martin and her mother, although the court did not
address this issue. Third, the court apparently implied a devise to the
New Mexico Boys Ranch when it determined that Martin's mother could
not take the estate. Finally, extrinsic evidence that shortly before her
death the testatrix placed the bulk of her property in trust for the benefit
of the New Mexico Boys Ranch supported the court's conclusion that
Martin intended the New Mexico Boys Ranch to receive her estate.
1. The Importance of a Testator's Intent
One goal of the Statute of Wills is to implement the intent of the
testator.27 Similarly, in construing a will, a court's primary consideration
25. A majority of states hold that negative bequests cannot prevent property from passing under
the statutes of descent and distribution. Page on Wills, supra note 4, at § 30.17. If a testator provides
that an heir shall receive no part of the estate, such heir nevertheless takes his or her share of any
intestate property. Id.; see, e.g., Kimley v. Whittaker, 63 N.J. 236, 306 A.2d 443 (1973) (exclu-
sionary language in the will did not prevent the testatrix' daughter from taking by intestacy). The
rule concerning negative bequests can be changed by statute under New York law. A will takes effect
upon death "whereby a person disposes of property or directs how it shall not be disposed of .... "
N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts § 1-2.18 (McKinney 1981). See also In re Will of Beu, 70 Misc. 2d
396, 333 N.Y.S.2d. 858 (1972) (words of disinheritance are effective as to intestate property).
26. New Mexico Boys Ranch v. Hanvey, 97 N.M. at 773, 642 P.2d at 857.
27. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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is the intent of the testator.28 Intent need not be declared expressly in the
will; it is sufficient if the intention can be clearly inferred from the
particular provisions of the will. 9
In construing a will, the testator's intent is to be determined from all
of the language contained in the four corners of the will.3" If the will,
considered as a whole, is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is not admis-
sible to vary or supplement the language of the will.31 Extrinsic evidence
may, however, be admitted to ascertain the meaning of an instrument
when it is doubtful or ambiguous.32 The testator's scheme of distribution,
the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of making the will,
and the existing facts may be considered by a court when the testator's
intent as expressed in the will is not clear.33
Some problems of intent are easier to resolve than others. It is partic-
ularly troublesome when the problem is one of incomplete disposition of
property. Mary E. Martin did not expressly dispose of her property in
the event her mother predeceased her. Yet, the court solved the problem
of the incomplete disposition by inferring Martin's intent from both the
will itself and from extrinsic evidence. The court focused upon the lan-
guage of the will, which disinherited Martin's heirs other than her mother.
Additionally, the court noted evidence outside the will which showed that
Martin, following her mother's death and shortly before her own death,
placed the bulk of her property in trust for the benefit of the New Mexico
Boys Ranch. From this evidence, the court thought it reasonable to imply
that Martin intended the New Mexico Boys Ranch to be the sole devisee
of her property.
2. Whether a Will Is Conditional Depends Upon the Intent of the
Testator
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, however, held that the simulta-
neous death clause conditioned the devise to the New Mexico Boys Ranch,
the condition was not met, and, therefore, the gift failed.34 Yet whether
a will is conditional depends upon the intent of the testator.35
28. New Mexico Boys Ranch, 97 N.M. at 773, 643 P.2d at 859.
29. See, e.g., Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal. 2d 885, 206 P.2d 360 (1949) (the intent of a testator may
be implied from all the language of an instrument and is not limited by any particular phrase); In
re Estate of Zahradnik, 6 Kan. App. 2d 84, 626 P.2d 1211 (1981) (intent of testators to contract
and be bound by a joint and mutual will may be ascertained circumstantially from other expressions
in the will).
30. In re Estate of Martin, 97 N.M. at 777, 643 P.2d at 863.
31. Id. at 776, 643 P.2d at 862.
32. Brown v. Brown, 53 N.M. 379, 208 P.2d 1081 (1949).
33. Greg v. Gardner, 73 N.M. 347, 388 P.2d 68 (1963).
34. In re Estate of Martin, 97 N.M. at 779, 643 P.2d at 865.
35. In re Estate of Desmond, 223 Cal. App. 2d 388, 35 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1963). Although the
will disposed of property in case of mishap and failure to return from a short trip due to some
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If an intestate result is clearly against the testator's intent, a court is
more likely to construe a conditional clause as unconditional rather than
to defeat the will. For example, the Utah Supreme Court in In re Estate
of Gardner36 interpreted a will wherein the testatrix intentionally omitted
six grandchildren from her will. She then willed her property to her two
daughters "in the event my husband precedes me in death. . .. -37 The
testatrix died before her husband. The court held it was the clear intent
of the testatrix that her daughters be the distributees of all her property,
despite the conditional phrase "in the event my husband precedes me in
death .. "38 Therefore, the estate passed to the two daughters. 39
The court in Gardner strongly emphasized the fact that the testatrix
clearly disinherited her grandchildren. If the condition precedent were
enforced, the heirs which the testatrix wished to disinherit would take
her estate. The court stated: "Such a construction would produce an absurd
result, clearly contrary to the intention of the testatrix as it is ascertained
from the four comers of the will. "' The court explained that if enforce-
ment of an alleged condition precedent creates an inconsistency with the
plain intent of the testatrix as unmistakably revealed in the remainder of
the will, then those words should be disregarded.4 Furthermore, if a
testator makes no express provision for an alternative gift upon failure
of a condition in a will, this omission tends to show the testator did not
intend to impose the condition. 4 2 In reaching its decision, the court ignored
the conditional language and the estate passed to the testatrix' daughters,
whom the testatrix clearly would have preferred to take over her intestate
heirs.43
In New Mexico Boys Ranch, the supreme court should have addressed
the issue of whether Martin had intended the devise to the New Mexico
Boys Ranch to be conditional. The court could have found the simulta-
neous death clause in the will to be language so inconsistent with other
language that finding the devise conditional would produce an absurd
result. The court did emphasize the presumption in favor of testacy,"
unforeseen accident, the court held the will not to be conditional. Id. The court reasoned that whether
an instrument is conditional or not depends upon the intent of the testator. Id. See also In re Estate
of Gardner, 615 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1980) (to render a will conditional, its language must show the
intent of the testator was to make a will operative only during a certain period or until a certain
emergency has passed).
36. 615 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1980).
37. Id. at 1216.
38. Id. at 1218.
39. Id.
40. ld.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 97 N.M. at 773, 643 P.2d at 859.
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which is stronger when the testator has included a residuary clause.45
Additionally, the supreme court could have noted that Martin had made
no alternative disposition of her property if the alleged condition precedent
failed. Therefore, the court might have concluded the testatrix did not
intend to impose the simultaneous death clause as a condition limiting
the devise to the New Mexico Boys Ranch.
The Florida District Court of Appeals in In Re Estate of Dickerhoff4 6
reached a result contrary to Gardner under similar facts. The testatrix
willed to her husband her entire estate and provided that "in the event
of a common casualty in which my husband and I should die simulta-
neously," her estate should go to William and Donna Jeffers.47 The court
held the disposition to these persons was conditional and the estate passed
by intestacy because the testatrix' husband predeceased her. 8 The dissent
in Dickerhoff, however, presented a persuasive argument for the opposite
result. The dissent reasoned that the language of a will should not be
taken literally when to do so does "violence to logic and reason and
produces a result which appears . . . to be contrary to the clear intent of
the testatrix. "49 The dissent stated it was illogical to assume the testatrix
intended the two distributees, William and Donna Jeffers, to take her
entire estate only if there was a "thousand to one chance" simultaneous
death would occur." The dissent criticized the majority opinion for ana-
lyzing the testatrix' intent solely on the basis of the language of the will,
without testing the result against common sense. The dissent concluded
the testatrix intended the Jeffers to take her estate in any event.5 '
The supreme court in New Mexico Boys Ranch could have followed
the reasoning of the dissent in Dickerhoff and tested the result of enforcing
the simultaneous death clause against common sense. It is unreasonable
to believe the testatrix intended to devise her property to the New Mexico
Boys Ranch only if there was a "thousand to one" chance of simultaneous
death. It is illogical to assume Martin intended to provide for the con-
tingency of simultaneous death, but not for the most probable case, her
mother predeceasing her.
45. In Riemcke v. Schreiner, 80 Wash. 2d 722, 497 P.2d 1319 (1972), the testatrix willed the
residue of her estate to her parents but the parents renounced their right to take under the will.
Instead of allowing the estate to pass by the laws of intestate succession, the court held the testatrix'
sister was entitled to the estate because she was the alternative beneficiary under the will in the
event testatrix' parents predeceased the testatrix. The court reasoned that the testatrix did not intend
to die intestate because she attempted to provide for all circumstances in her will. Furthermore, the
presumption of testacy is stronger where the language of a residuary clause is used.
46. 267 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
47. Id. at 389.
48. Id.
49. Id. (Owen, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 390.
51. Id.
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3. A Gift by Implication to the New Mexico Boys Ranch
Even if Martin had not intended to condition her devise to the New
Mexico Boys Ranch, it is apparent that Martin failed to provide for a
disposition of her property in the event her mother predeceased her. The
traditional view states that a court cannot supply an omitted provision.
This rule was followed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in In re
Estate of Martin.52 The court of appeals stated that "the will before us
must be construed as written and we cannot make a new will for the
testatrix. ""
Some courts, however, have used the theory of gift by implication to
supply an omission in a will where a firm basis for the construction is
found in the will itself.54 Under the theory of gift by implication, gifts
are implied from the language of the entire will to fulfill the intent of the
testator.55 No unattested words are added to the will. The will is construed
as written. To imply a gift, evidence of the intent must be so strong that
a contrary intent cannot reasonably be supposed to have existed in the
testator's mind. 6
Under the theory of gift by implication, two conflicting policies face
a court. On one hand, a court is obliged to enforce the intent of the
testator. In most cases, implication of a gift will prevent intestacy. Usually
the facts lead to an inference that the gap in disposition occurred merely
through inadvertence.57 On the other hand, courts are naturally reluctant
to speculate about the intent of the testator when the will does not con-
template the occurrence of a particular event. 58 A devise "to A for life,
remainder to B if A dies without children," has given courts an opportunity
to imply a gift. If A dies with children, some courts have concluded that
the testator intended to devise the property to A's children.59
In New Mexico, the supreme court embraced the gift by implication
theory in In re Will of McDowell.' In that case, a joint and mutual will
52. 97 N.M. at 778, 643 P.2d at 864. See also Heinneman v. Colorado College, 150 Colo. 515,
374 P.2d 695 (1962); Leibrandt v. Adler, 30 Ill. App. 2d 257, 174 N.E.2d 228 (1961). But see
Brasser v. Hutchison, 37 Colo. App. 528, 549 P.2d 801 (1976) (in giving effect to the intent of the
testator, words may be supplied, rejected, or transposed).
53. 97 N.M. at 778, 643 P.2d at 864.
54. See, e.g., Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal. 2d 885, 206 P.2d 360 (1949) (where an intention to make
a gift appears in a will, a court will create a gift by implication); Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649
(Iowa 1979) (when a testator's will clearly reveals a general plan of disposition, a gift may be
implied with regard to the unmentioned contingency).
55. In re D'Alessandro's Will, 55 Misc. 2d 909, 286 N.Y.S.2d 914, 920 (1968). See infra text
accompanying note 62 for discussion of this case.
56. Id. See also Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tingley, 22 Wash. App. 258, 589 P.2d 811 (1978)
(to imply a gift, the showing of the testator's intent must be so strong that a contrary intent cannot
be supposed to have existed in the testator's mind).
57. L. Simes & A. Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 841 (2d ed. 1956).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 842.
60. 81 N.M. 562, 469 P.2d 711 (1970).
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contained no express provision for disposition of the testators' estate upon
death of the survivor. Considering the purpose of the will and the intent
of the testators based upon the entire will, the court determined both
testators intended that the survivor should have a life estate in the property,
with remainder to nieces and nephews upon the death of the surviving
testator. The court stated: "It is well settled that a gift by implication will
be implied in order to effectuate the intent of the testator . . 6
The New Mexico Supreme Court in McDowell cited the case of In re
D'Alessandro's Will62 as support for the gift by implication theory. In
D'Alessandro, the court read into the simultaneous death clause the omit-
ted and most probable contingency, that either the testator's spouse or
parent would predecease the testator. A joint and mutual will of husband
and wife provided that if they should die simultaneously, they devised
the residue of the estate to their nieces. The will did not provide for the
event of either spouse predeceasing the other. The wife died before the
husband. The court set forth a test for determining a gift by implication:
whether in viewing the will as a whole, it leaves no doubt in the mind
of the court that the testator intended a distributee to share in the estate
although the event that occurred was not specified in the will itself.63 The
court found it unreasonable to assume the testator intended to limit dis-
tribution to the nieces only to the event of simultaneous death with his
wife. 6 The nieces were the only distributees specified in the will who
survived the testator, and the court must have presumed the testator would
have preferred the nieces over intestate heirs. Therefore, the court read
into the simultaneous death clause the omitted and most probable con-
tingency and supplied a gift by implication. 65
If the supreme court in New Mexico Boys Ranch had applied the D'A-
lessandro test for determining a gift by implication, it could have read
into Martin's will the omitted and most probable contingency that Martin's
mother would predecease her. Considering the will as a whole, the court
could have found it unreasonable to assume the testatrix intended to limit
distribution to the New Mexico Boys Ranch only in the event of simul-
taneous death of herself and her mother.
61. Id. at 564, 469 P.2d at 713.
62. 55 Misc. 2d 909, 286 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
63. Id. at __, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
64. Id. at..., 286 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
65. Similarly, in In re Hardie's Estate, 176 Misc. 2i, 26 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1941), aff'd, 263 A.D.
927, 33 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1942), relied upon by the court in D'Alessandro, the court found a testa-
mentary intent that relatives of the testator should not take under the will. The court implied a gift
to the distributees under a simultaneous death clause even though the testator did not die simulta-
neously with his wife. The court stated: "It does not appear to me that Charles Hardie [testator]
chose these beneficiaries only in the event of his dying simultaneously with his wife. I believe he
intended them to be his beneficiaries in any event. ... In re Hardie's Estate, 176 Misc. at 23, 26
N.Y.S.2d at 335. The court stated that between two possible constructions, an interpretation which
avoids intestacy is preferred. Id. at 24, 26 N Y.S.2d at 336.
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A gift contingent upon simultaneous death, however, need not be con-
strued uniformly as indicating an intent that such a gift is to be effective
even though the contingency does not occur. 6' For example, in In re
Estate of Bromley,67 the court construed a will in which the testatrix
bequeathed a life estate to her son with a remainder to her grandson
contingent upon the death of the testatrix and her husband as a result of
a common disaster. The will, however, contained no provision for the
death of the husband prior to the death of the testatrix. The testatrix'
husband predeceased her by several years. The court held the bequest to
be contingent under the simultaneous death clause. Therefore, the gift
under the simultaneous death clause failed, and the testatrix' entire estate
passed by intestacy to her son.68
Perhaps the distinguishing feature between D'Alessandro and Bromley
is that in D'Alessandro the distributees under the simultaneous death
clause were not the heirs at law. In Bromley, the son of the testatrix would
have taken a life estate under the simultaneous death clause and the entire
estate under the laws of intestacy. Consequently, the court in Bromley
could not presume the testatrix would prefer the remainderman distributee
under the simultaneous death clause over the heirs at law when the son
of the testatrix qualified in part either way. The court refused to rewrite
the will because it was not able, in these circumstances, to find the will
ambiguous.
The theory of gift by implication is a satisfactory justification for the
result reached by the supreme court in New Mexico Boys Ranch. Once
the court determined Martin had intended the New Mexico Boys Ranch
to receive her estate if her mother predeceased her, a gift to the New
Mexico Boys Ranch could have been implied from the testatrix' testa-
mentary plan and from the language of the will. Specifically, the language
of the will whereby Martin expressly disinherited her heirs at law, in-
dicated she would have preferred the New Mexico Boys Ranch to receive
her estate over her heirs in the event her mother predeceased her.
4. Extrinsic Evidence of an Inter Vivos Trust for the Benefit of the
New Mexico Boys Ranch
Extrinsic evidence of an inter vivos trust also supported the argument
that the testatrix intended to leave her estate to the New Mexico Boys
Ranch. Martin placed the bulk of her property in trust for the benefit of
the New Mexico Boys Ranch after her mother's death and shortly before
66. Bradshaw v. Lewis, 54111. 2d 304, 296 N.E.2d 747 (1973) (gift contingent upon simultaneous
death of testators failed and gift by implication was not applicable); In re Estate of Blansett, 28 I11.
App. 3d 552, 328 N.E.2d 593 (1975) (where husband and wife did not die simultaneously, will was
not construed to imply a gift).
67. 88 Misc. 2d 112, 387 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1976).
68. Id. at __ 387 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
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her own death.69 Neither party presented this evidence to the court of
appeals, however, because both contended the will was unambiguous.7"
The court of appeals in In re Estate of Martin declared that no extrinsic
evidence was necessary to arrive at the intent of the testatrix as expressed
in her will.7
Where a will is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
vary, contradict, or add language to the will.72 The Statute of Wills would
serve little purpose if ambiguities could be created routinely by extrinsic
evidence.73 Where the language of the will is ambiguous, however, ex-
trinsic evidence may be admitted to assist the court in ascertaining its
meaning.74 The court of appeals in In re Estate of Martin stated: "The
critical test for determining whether a will is ambiguous is whether the
intent of the testator or testatrix can be determined from the four comers
of the instrument itself. If the testamentary intent can be gleaned from
the face of the will, ambiguity does not exist." 75 A determination that a
will is ambiguous and admission of extrinsic evidence to explain what is
written in the will remedies any obscurities in the will without adding
unattested language to the will. Therefore, the Statute of Wills is not
violated because the court merely is interpreting what is already written.
One case has been decided since New Mexico Boys Ranch in which a
document has been determined to be ambiguous and extrinsic evidence
was considered to clarify the a'mbiguity.76 The New Mexico Court of
Appeals in Spencer v. Gutierrez77 found that property was ambiguously
described in a will. The court drew a reasonable inference of the property
to which the address was referring by considering the relationship between
the parties, the testators' distribution scheme, and the testimony of the
draftsman who prepared the will.78 From this extrinsic evidence, the court
69. New Mexico Boys Ranch, 97 N.M. at 772, 643 P.2d at 858.
70. In re Estate of Martin, 97 N.M. at 775, 643 P.2d at 861.
71. Id. at 777, 643 P.2d at 863.
72. Lamphear v. Alch, 58 N.M. 796, 801, 277 P.2d 299, 302 (1954). In Lamphear, the court
held that although the language of the will bequeathing personal property was not legally sufficient
to transfer title to real estate, the will was too clear and unambiguous to permit extrinsic evidence.
Id.
73. See Langbein and Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 4, at 566. See, e.g., Watkins
v. Jones, 193 S.E. 889 (Ga. 1937) (court will not refuse to probate a will due to extrinsic evidence
that testator was angry with his daughter when he executed his will).
74. Brown v. Brown, 53 N.M. 379, 208 P.2d 1081 (1949). See also In re Estate of Taff, 63 Cal.
App. 3d 319, 133 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1976) (extrinsic evidence was admissible to show the existence
of and resolution of a latent ambiguity in the will); In re Estate of Zahradnik, 6 Kan. App. 2d 84,
626 P.2d 1211 (1981) (ambiguity in the language of a joint will allowed admissibility of extrinsic
evidence to establish either the existence or nonexistence of a contract).
75. In re Estate of Martin, 97 N.M. at 776, 643 P.2d at 862 (quoting In re Estate of Zahradnick,
6 Kan. App. 2d 84, -_, 626 P.2d 1211, 1217 (1981)).
76. Spencer v. Gutierrez, 99 N.M. 712, 663 P.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1983). In another case, Lemon
v. Hall, 97 N.M. 429, 640 P.2d 929 (1982), the New Mexico Supreme Court recently used extrinsic
evidence to clarify an ambiguous trial court decision construing a trust instrument.
77. 99 N.M. 712, 663 P.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1983).
78. Id. at 715, 663 P.2d at 374.
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determined the testators intended to give the entire property in question
to their son, Ralph Gutierrez, instead of only the property identified by
address in the will.
79
In New Mexico Boys Ranch, the New Mexico Supreme Court could
have found Martin's will was ambiguous in the sense that the court of
appeals and the trial court interpreted the will differently and reached
conflicting results. The supreme court could have considered the extrinsic
evidence of the trust for the benefit of the New Mexico Boys Ranch which
would have made the intent of the testatrix more clear. This extrinsic
evidence, and the clauses in the testatrix' will disinheriting her brother
and any possible heirs, indicated Martin's plain intent to leave her estate
to the New Mexico Boys Ranch.
The holding in New Mexico Boys Ranch, however, must be read nar-
rowly. The decision does not satisfactorily explain how the court decided
that the gift was unconditional. Nor does the court explicitly justify its
conclusion as implying a gift from very strong evidence of intent. Courts
have not uniformly implied gifts from a will in order to complete a
disposition of the testator's property.80 Yet, the court in New Mexico Boys
Ranch reached an appropriate result by implying a gift because one policy
of the law of wills is to uphold rather than defeat testamentary dispositions.
B. Reforming a Will in Violation of the Statute of Wills
The second part of this Note suggests two remedies that a court may
utilize to effectuate the intent of the testator. Both remedies, however,
potentially conflict with the Statute of Wills, which requires all the words
of a will to be written and witnessed at the time the testator signs the
will.8 The policy of the Statute of Wills to prevent fraud is designed to
protect the expressed desires of the testator from persons who may wish
to alter the testator's will to benefit themselves. 2 This policy is embodied
by a rule known as the "no-reformation" rule, which prevents the addition
of unattested language to a will. 3 When a court is charged with the
interpretation of a will, however, it does not stand to benefit as a distri-
butee of the property. If the proof of omission or mistake is convincing,
a court should add or delete words in order to effectuate what is clearly
the testator's intent as expressed in the will itself.8 4
79. Id. at 714, 663 P.2d at 373.
80. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
82. Id.
83. See Langbein and Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 4, at 528-29.
84. Id. at 526. See also In re Blalock's Estate, 95 Cal. 2d 46, 213 P.2d 100 (1949) (where it
clearly appears on the face of the will that words have been omitted, those words may be supplied
to carry out the intention of the testator as manifested by the context); Brasser v. Hutchison, 37
Colo. App. 528, 549 P.2d 801 (1976) (in giving effect to the intent of the testator, words may be
supplied, rejected, or transposed).
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1. Deleting Portions of the Simultaneous Death Clause from
Martin's Will
In construing a will, a court may delete words that the testator did not
intend.85 Deletion of words, however, is an extreme remedy which courts
should use only as a last resort. Once a mistake has been proven, the
court usually strikes the appropriate language leaving a blank in the will.
Extrinsic evidence then is admitted to construe the resulting ambiguity
as to the person or thing intended.86
The supreme court in New Mexico Boys Ranch could have corrected
the testatrix' failure to provide for the circumstance of her mother pre-
deceasing her by deleting most of the simultaneous death clause from the
will. The result of this deletion would have been as follows: "I then give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, remainder and residue of my estate
...to the New Mexico Boys Ranch. ... " The New Mexico Boys Ranch
would have been entitled to Martin's estate as an unconditional residuary
beneficiary. This remedy would have complied with one of the primary
purposes of the Statute of Wills, to effectuate the intent of the testator,
if the court had found the words it deleted to have been present through
mistake or inadvertence. There was, however, no evidence presented in
New Mexico Boys Ranch of mistake or inadvertence.
2. Adding Language to Martin's Will
It is generally held that an omission or mistake in a will cannot be
corrected by a court.87 The court of appeals in In re Estate of Martin
strictly adhered to the "no-reformation" rule and declared, "[t]estatrix'
failure to include in her will an unqualified provision disposing of her
estate to another if her mother predeceased her . . is a factor that cannot
be cured now by the court." 88
Yet, in some jurisdictions, omissions may be supplied by a court to
effectuate the intent of the testator as expressed in the will. If it is certain
beyond a reasonable doubt that the testator has not expressed himself or
herself as intended, the omitted language may be added to the will.89 For
85. See supra notes 8 and 9. See, e.g., Brasser v. Hutchison, 37 Colo. App. 523, 549 P.2d 801
(1976) (spendthrift clause in a will was disregarded as inconsistent with the testator's obvious intent);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tingley, 22 Wash. App. 258, 589 P.2d 811 (1978) (anti-lapse clause was
deleted from will as a drafting mistake).
86. See, e.g., Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886) (mistake in description of property); Brick-
heimer v. Kraft, 133 I11. App. 2d 410, 273 N.E.2d 468 (1971) (mistake in name of nephew's wife);
Moore v. Bean, 82 N.M. 189, 417 P.2d 823 (1970) (mistake in name of charity); In re Estate of
Gibbs, 14 Wisc. 2d 490, 111 N.W.2d 413 (1961) (mistake in middle initial of distributee).
87. Page on Wills, supra note 4, at § 13.7.
88. 97 N.M. at 778, 643 P.2d at 864.
89. In Kostos v. Anderson, 240 P.2d 73 (Okla. 1952), the court held that an omission of a section
number in the description of real property may be supplied by extrinsic evidence. See also McCauley
v. Alexander, 543 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), where the court added the phrase "all of my
property and estate," which the attorney mistakenly omitted. Id. at 701.
[Vol. 14
Spring 1984]
example, in In re Estate of Snide' a husband and wife who executed
mutual wills at a common execution ceremony mistakenly signed the will
intended for the other. The two wills were identical except for obvious
differences in names of donors and beneficiaries. The court reformed this
obvious mistake by substituting the husband's name whenever the wife's
name appeared and vice versa. The court reasoned that even though
evidence of the testators' testamentary scheme was dependent upon proof
outside the will, there was absolutely no danger of fraud due to the
contemporaneous execution ceremony.9' Both wills were executed with
statutory formality and attested by the same witnesses. In essence, the
court brushed aside the strict compliance with the Statute of Wills to
remedy an obvious mistake.92 The clear proof of mistake and the im-
portance of implementing the testator's true intent were the decisive
elements in the court's decision.93
If such a remedy had been employed in New Mexico Boys Ranch, the
supreme court could have added the language "also, in the event my
mother precedes me in death" to Martin's devise to the New Mexico
Boys Ranch. With this remedy, the New Mexico Boys Ranch would have
been entitled to Martin's entire estate. This remedy appears extraordinary
in light of the policies underlying the Statute of Wills because it gives
effect to words not attested by the formalities required by the Statute of
Wills. It is supported, however, by a primary purpose of the Statute of
Wills: to effectuate the intent of the testator. The risk of fraud from a
court adding or deleting language from a will varies from situation to
situation. In a case such as In re Estate of Snide, the risk of fraud seems
minimal.
A new theory supporting the addition of language to a will has been
developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Engle v. Siegel.94 In that
case, a husband and wife who were killed in a common disaster left
identical wills except for appropriate alterations as to names and rela-
tionships. Both wills devised the residue of their property one-half to the
husband's mother, Rose Siegel, and one-half to the wife's mother, Ida
Engle. Siegel predeceased her son and daughter-in-law. Engle argued that
the entire residuary estate passed to her under a New Jersey statute, which
provides that the share of any residuary devisee dying before the testator
shall be vested in the remaining residuary devisees unless a contrary
intent appears in the will.95 Siegel's surviving children claimed her one-
half interest. The court awarded one-half of the estate to the surviving
90. 52 N.Y.2d 193, 418 N.E.2d 656, 437 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1981).
91. Id. at 197, 418 N.E.2d at 658, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
92. Langbein and Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 4, at 564-65.
93. Id. at 565.
94. 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977).
95. N.J. Stat. Ann. §3A:3-14 (West 1953).
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children of Siegel based upon the testimony of the attorney who drafted
the wills. The attorney testified that both testators wanted to divide their
property equally between the two families and each mother was consid-
ered an appropriate representative of each family.' Looking at the ex-
trinsic evidence of the testators' intent, the court used the doctrine of
probable intent to provide for a contingency, the death of Rose Siegel,
which the testators' did not delineate in their wills.
Under the doctrine of probable intent, a court strives to ascertain what
the testator subjectively would have desired had the testator in fact ad-
dressed the contingency.97 The court in Engle relied upon the analytical
approach taken in In re Estate of Burke:9 8
First, a contingency for which no provision is made in the will was
identified as having occurred. The family circumstances and the plan
of testamentary disposition set forth in the will were then carefully
studied. Finally, the court placed itself in the position of the testatrix
and decided how she would probably have responded to the contin-
gency had she in fact envisioned its occurrence."
If the doctrine of probable intent had been applied in New Mexico Boys
Ranch, the court could have used the following reasoning. First, that
Martin failed to provide for a contingency which occurred, the death of
her mother before her own death. Second, the court could have considered
the testatrix' family circumstances and testamentary plan. The testatrix
had no immediate family besides her brother, whom she specifically
disinherited, and all other possible heirs were bequeathed one dollar.
Finally, the court, by placing itself in the position of the testatrix, could
have decided how she would have responded to the contingency had she
in fact envisioned its occurrence. If Martin had anticipated that her mother
might predecease her, certainly she would have preferred the New Mexico
Boys Ranch to take her estate over her intestate heirs. This probable intent
may have been further demonstrated by Martin's placement of the bulk
of her estate in trust for the benefit of the New Mexico Boys Ranch shortly
before her death.
The doctrine of probable intent in Engle appears to be a new theory
for overcoming the problem of unattested language. Extrinsic evidence
of the testator's own declarations are admissible to prove the testator's
probable intent had the testator considered the contingency which occurred
but was omitted from the will. This theory, however, directly contradicts
96. 74 N.J. at __, 377 A.2d at 896.
97. Id. at -. , 377 A.2d at 894.
98. 48 N.J. 50, -, 222 A.2d 273, 280 (1966).
99. 74 N.J. at __, 377 A.2d at 895.
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the "no-reformation" rule that an omitted devise cannot be added to a
will.00
Yet, the "no-reformation" rule should not be an insurmountable ob-
struction to adding an omitted devise to a will. When a court construes
a will as passing property not mentioned, or as passing title to a distributee
whose name was omitted, or when a court substitutes language, it is in
effect reforming the will. Interpreting a will in a sense adds to a will by
clarifying it. A court's reluctance to admit that it is reforming a will stems
from its desire to avoid appearing to violate the Statute of Wills.
The court's power to interpret a will is broad. The evidentiary policy
of the Statute of Wills might be better safeguarded if courts utilized a
clear and convincing standard of proof of mistake to substantiate refor-
mation of a will. "o This standard would effectuate the intent of the testator
and would end the manipulation of rules of construction and the creation
of exceptions.0 2 Therefore, in the future, practitioners may wish to con-
front the court directly with a suggestion of reforming a will if proof of
an omission is clear.
IV. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in New Mexico Boys Ranch
was appropriate if it enforced the expressed, but inartfully drawn, inten-
tion of Mary E. Martin regarding the disposition of her estate. If there
is little doubt as to whether a testator would prefer the residuary bene-
ficiary to receive the estate over intestate heirs, the will should be con-
strued to carry out the desires of the testator. To enforce this intent, the
supreme court construed all the provisions of the will as providing an
unconditional gift to the New Mexico Boys Ranch. The court probably
determined that Martin did not intend to condition her devise to the New
Mexico Boys Ranch upon the simultaneous death of herself and her
mother because she did not provide for an alternative disposition of her
property if the contingency failed. More importantly, the extrinsic evi-
dence of a trust for the benefit of the New Mexico Boys Ranch indicated
the clear intent of the testatrix to leave her estate to the New Mexico
Boys Ranch.
The theory of gift by implication supports the court's decision. This
theory is consistent with the court's emphasis on the presumption in favor
of testacy and the intent of the testator based upon the will as a whole.
100. Langbein and Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 4, at 561.
101. Id. at 569.
102. Id. at 590.
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Finally, the theory of gift by implication is consistent with the policies
underlying the Statute of Wills because it requires the court merely to
construe the language of the will and does not add unattested language
or delete language. Until the New Mexico Supreme Court admits it is
abandoning the "no-reformation" rule, the theory of gift by implication
constitutes an adequate rationale for the conclusion reached in New Mexico
Boys Ranch.
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